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Abstract  
Purpose: This paper examined the efficiency of Indian banks and the interrelationships 
between insolvency risk, capital and efficiency. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: We employed Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to assess 
cost and profit efficiencies of Indian banks and a three-stage least squares estimator to 
investigate relationships between risk, capital and efficiency.  
 
Findings: Cost and profit efficiencies of Indian banks studied are 0.950 and 0.934, 
respectively; public banks are more cost-efficient, but slightly less profit-efficient than 
private banks; and bank efficiency experienced an unclear trend over the period 1994-2011. 
Indian banks benefit from technological progress and scale expansion in reducing costs and 
increasing profits. A decline in cost efficiency is generally followed by an increase in 
insolvency risk (bad management) while a rise in insolvency risk in public banks is generally 
followed by a decline in cost efficiency (bad luck). An increase in profit efficiency in public 
banks temporarily precedes an increase in the insolvency risk (skimping) but a decrease in 
capital ratio is generally followed by an increase in the insolvency risk (moral hazard). Better 
capitalized banks suffer lower insolvency risk and achieve higher profit efficiency. 
 
Practical implications: Bank regulators and supervisors may consider: using cost and profit 
efficiencies as good predictors of risk; limiting public banks’ exposures to external shocks; 
and considering capital ratio as an efficient tool to reduce insolvency risk and improve profit. 
 
Originality/value: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive investigation 
of the efficiency and its relationship to capital and risk in Indian banks. 
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1. Introduction 
The banking system in India plays an important role in the development of the financial 
system and the economy as a whole. Since the 1990s, India has gradually implemented bank 
reforms towards deregulation to reduce default risk and improve efficiency of Indian banks. 
India adopted the Basel Accord on capital standards: Basel I in 1992 and Basel II in 2009; the 
minimum capital to risk weighted asset ratio (CRAR) was set to  8% by 1995 and 9% by 
2000 for commercial banks (Sarma and Nikaidō, 2007). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no comprehensive studies examining effects of these reforms. This 
motivates us to investigate the interplay between capital ratio, default risk and operational 
efficiency of Indian banks since early 1990s.  
 
The literature is scant on the interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency, but most 
of these studies are on European or the U.S. banks. Several studies on the efficiency of Indian 
banks, but only one study by  Das and Ghosh (2004) examining the association between risk, 
capital and efficiency in Indian banks has been identified. However, this study covered only 
public banks; considered only cost efficiency; and analysed a short period 1992 to 1999.  We 
analyse both cost and profit efficiency and examine effects of the scale and technological 
progress, and hence, provide a more comprehensive picture about the efficiency of the Indian 
banking system in the post-reform period. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
examination of the interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency for the whole Indian 
banking system as well as its bank types. Our study is also the first to predict the managerial 
behaviours in Indian banks and to assess if they vary across bank types.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the framework of the 
management behaviour and the related literature. Section 3 discusses research methodology. 
Section 4 analyses empirical results and section 5 draws conclusions and addresses policy 
implications. 
 
3 
 
2. Managerial hypotheses and Literature review  
2.1. Managerial hypotheses  
Four managerial hypotheses have been identified by Berger and DeYoung (1997): bad 
management, bad luck, skimming and moral hazard. The possible relationship between risk, 
capital and efficiency provides evidence of the management behaviour a bank exhibits as 
summarized below. 
Bad management is identified if a decrease in cost efficiency temporarily precedes an 
increase in the level of risk. Banks with poor senior management may fail to control 
operational costs and monitor borrowers, hence, increase risk and then lower cost efficiency. 
Such banks also tend to have poor loan and investment portfolios, causing low revenue 
efficiency. In order to improve the low economic efficiency, these poorly managed banks 
tend to take additional risks, leading to a growth in insolvency risk.  
 
Bad luck has the reverse temporal ordering to bad management: an increase in risk occurs 
before a reduction in economic efficiency. One possible explanation is that when exogenous 
events, like regional economic downturns, worsen asset quality and then fuel insolvency risk, 
bank managers must allocate additional resources, like personnel on monitoring loans and 
seizing and disposing of collateral, to remedy this adverse situation. As a consequence, banks 
incur additional operating costs and lose some income, leading to the deterioration of cost 
and profit efficiency. 
 
Moral hazard is identified if a reduction in capital ratio in the poorly capitalized banks leads 
to a growth in risk. This is because banks which are suffering risks due to low capital suffer 
more risks due to the declined capital ratio, thereby facing moral hazard incentives to take 
risky portfolios. Under this hypothesis, we expect that a reduction in financial capital precede 
an increase in non-performing loans.  
 
Skimping behaviour is identified if an increase in cost efficiency temporarily precedes an 
increase in insolvency risk, which is an opposite sign to the bad management behaviour 
despite having the same temporal order. The possible reason is that banks tend to skimp on 
operating costs by reducing credit monitoring, collateral valuing and marketing activities to 
become more economically efficient. However, the improvement in economic efficiency due 
to the skimping may be achieved only in the short term, since the consequences of skimping 
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are the deterioration in the quality of loans and investments, resulting in greater insolvency 
risk.  
 
2.2. Literature review 
The literature on bank efficiency in India is vast (Das and Ghosh, 2004; Das et al., 2005; 
Sensarma, 2005; Das and Ghosh, 2009; Kalluru, 2009; Ray and Das, 2010; Das and Drine, 
2011; Sahoo and Mandal, 2011; Wanniarachchige and Suzuki, 2011; Kumar, 2013; Reddy 
and Nirmala, 2013), but only one study (Das and Ghosh, 2004) examined the 
interrelationships between risk, capital and cost efficiency in Indian public banks  in the 
1992-1999 period. The authors found that capital ratio reduced bank risk, while cost 
efficiency had no effect on bank risk and capital ratio. Moreover, an increase in bank risk led 
to a decrease in cost efficiency while capital ratio had no effect on banks’ efficiency. Other 
studies documented conflicting results on the efficiency trend, efficiency gap between public 
banks and private banks, and the effects of capital ratio and risk on economic efficiency. For 
example, Das et al. (2005) found an increase in the profit efficiency, while Sensarma (2005) 
and Wanniarachchige and Suzuki (2011) found a reverse trend. Kalluru (2009) and 
Wanniarachchige and Suzuki (2011) found a declining trend in cost efficiency while Sahoo 
and Mandal (2011) found an increasing trend. Indian public banks were found to be more 
cost-efficient than private banks in the studies by Sahoo and Mandal (2011), 
Wanniarachchige and Suzuki (2011), but comparably cost-efficient in the study by Das and 
Drine (2011), and less profit-efficient than private banks in the study by Sensarma (2005). 
The effects of capital ratio on profit efficiency were positive in the study by Reddy and 
Nirmala (2013), but negative in the study by Das and Ghosh (2009), while there was no 
association between cost efficiency and capital ratio in the study by Kalluru (2009).  
 
The number of international studies, mostly on European or U.S. banks, on the 
interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency are also limited: Tan and Floros (2013), 
Fiordelisi et al. (2011), Deelchand and Padgett (2010), Altunbas et al. (2007), Williams 
(2004), Berger and DeYoung (1997), and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997). Main findings of these 
studies predicted bad management behaviour in European banks (Williams, 2004; Fiordelisi 
et al., 2011), Japanese cooperative banks (Deelchand and Padgett, 2010), and the U.S. banks 
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997). Bad luck and moral hazard 
behaviours were found in Japanese cooperative banks (Deelchand and Padgett, 2010) and the 
U.S. banks (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997). Skimping behaviour 
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was predicted in European banks (Altunbas et al., 2007) and the U.S. banks (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997). Banks with more capital were found to suffer less risk in China (Tan and 
Floros, 2013) and the U.S. (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997), but capital was found to have  no 
significant impact on risk in European banks (Williams, 2004; Fiordelisi et al., 2011). Better 
capitalized banks were found to operate more cost-efficiently in Europe (Fiordelisi et al., 
2011), but less efficiently in Japan (Deelchand and Padgett, 2010). In Europe, more cost-
efficient banks were  better capitalized (Fiordelisi et al., 2011), and took less risk (Altunbas et 
al., 2007), but reverse stories were found in Japan (Deelchand and Padgett, 2010) and the 
U.S. (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997).  
 
Overall, the literature seems to provide conflicting signs and temporal order of 
interrelationships between capital, risk and operational efficiency of banks. One may argue 
that, these results reflect differences in: choice of variables, sample size, analysis periods and 
estimation methods. However, Berger and DeYoung (1997) suggested that inverse signs and 
temporal orders may simply reflect different managerial behaviours (e.g., bad luck, bad 
management, skimping, and moral hazard). One possible way to differentiate these 
behaviours is to estimate the interrelationships between risk, capital and operational 
efficiency simultaneously as a system. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Efficiency estimation 
We apply a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) approach proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and 
Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) to estimate cost and profit efficiency scores. We adopt 
the transcendental logarithm (translog) functional form since it is more flexible and provide 
desired properties (e.g., monotonicity and asymmetry) to decompose changes in technical 
efficiency into components of interests such as technological progress and returns to scale 
(Berger and Mester, 1997; Huang et al., 2010; Košak and Zorić, 2011). To take into account 
effects of environmental factors, we apply the technical efficiency effects SFA  model 
proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). Also, the efficiency component was assumed to 
follow a truncated distribution, and technological changes were proxied by a time trend (t). 
We follow the intermediation approach, which views a bank as an intermediary between 
depositors and borrowers, to specify inputs and outputs. Based on data available, the 
production of banking services in this study involves two outputs – net loans (Y1) and other 
earning assets (Y2)- and three inputs – fund (X1), fixed assets (X2) and personnel (X3). 
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Therefore, prices of inputs X1-3 are financial capital price (W1), physical capital price (W2) 
and labour price (W3), respectively.  
 
The translog stochastic cost frontier to estimate cost efficiency for the panel data is as 
follows: 
 
where the subscript i denotes the cross-sectional dimension across banks, subscript t denotes 
the time dimension.  Parameters α, β,  and γ of the cost function captures the unknown 
technology of the banking system and is estimated by maximum likelihood method. TC is the 
observed total cost, which consists of interest expenses, other operating expenses and 
personnel expenses. The error term v represents the statistical noise, while the error term u 
accounts for the non-negative cost inefficiency, which is assumed to have truncated-normal 
distribution and to be independent of v. 
 
By exploiting the linear homogeneity condition, this model is transformed into a cost function 
by normalizing the dependent variable and all input prices by the price of input 3 (W3) as 
follows (subscripts i and t are dropped for ease of viewing):  
 
We define SFA profit function in a similar manner: replacing the notation of total costs (TC) 
by that of the profit before tax (PBT), and making the inverse sign for the non-negative 
component of the error term u. We also transform the original profits, which have negative 
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values, by subtracting the minimum and adding the mean to ensure the validity when taking a 
natural logarithm. 
 
The individual cost and profit efficiency scores are calculated, respectively, as CEit = exp(-uit) 
and PEit = exp(-uit). CE and PE will range from 0 (very poorly operate banks) to 1 (best-
practiced banks). 
 
Economies of scale 
To examine effects of operational scale on costs and profits, we respectively estimate cost 
elasticity ( ) and profit elasticity ( ) by taking the derivatives of the transformed 
function with respect to all output variables as follows (note that the transform function is 
assumed to follow the monotonicity assumption, hence the cost elasticity can be calculated by 
taking derivatives to output): 
 
 
An estimate of  less than, equal to, or greater than one respectively indicates increasing, 
constant and decreasing returns to scale. The respective three categories of scale economies 
for a profit function are defined by having  less than, equal to, or greater than zero. 
 
Technological progress 
To investigate the effects of technological progress on costs and profits of banks, we 
calculate cost elasticity ( ) and profit elasticity ( ) with respect to time (t) as follows:  
 
 
Technological progress is defined as having negative time derivatives for cost function (i.e., 
reduces costs over time) and positive time derivative for profit function (i.e., increases profits 
over time). Technological regresses occur if the derivatives are negative (for the profit 
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function) and/or positive (for the cost function) while neutral technological changes occur if 
the derivatives are equal to zero. 
 
3.2. Interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency  
We employ the three-stage least squares (3SLS), introduced by Zellner and Theil (1962), to 
investigate the interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency as in the study by Tan 
and Floros (2013). Some other approaches in the literature are two-stage least squares (Kwan 
and Eisenbeis, 1997; Deelchand and Padgett, 2010), seemly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
(Altunbas et al., 2007), Granger causality tests (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004; 
Fiordelisi et al., 2011), and decomposing technical efficiency into operating efficiency and 
risk management efficiency (Yang, 2014). However, results obtained by the Granger 
causality are sensitive to model specification and the number of lags. Also, the efficiency 
decomposition approach required data on non-performing loans which we cannot obtain. 
Therefore, we select the 3SLS estimator, which combines the two-stage least squares and 
SUR, for our study. 
 
We measure bank risk by Z-score, efficiency by the technical efficiency scores of cost and 
profit functions, and capital by the ratio of equity to total assets. Z-score is computed by the 
ratio of return on assets (ROA) plus the capital ratio divided by the standard deviation of 
ROA, which measures the degree of bank insolvency (Roy, 1952). The choice of Z-score as a 
risk measure was applied in various studies by Tan and Floros (2013),  Beck et al. (2013), 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Houston et al. (2010), Laeven and Levine (2009) and 
many others. The literature also exists other measures of risk such as ratio of loan loss 
provision to gross loans (Williams, 2004; Tan and Floros, 2013), ratio of loan loss reserves to 
total assets (Altunbas et al., 2007; Deelchand and Padgett, 2010), ratio of non-performing 
loans to gross loans (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Das and Ghosh, 2004; Fiordelisi et al., 
2011), and 1 or 5-year expected default frequency (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). However, the later 
approach (expected default frequency) requires data on stock prices while many Indian banks 
do not have public traded securities. The three former measures (loan loss/total loans, loan 
loss/assets, and non-performing ratio) are subject to managerial discretion and capture only 
credit risks, while non-lending earning assets accounts for approximately 40% of the outputs 
of Indian banks. Hence, Z-score is more appropriate for measuring bank risk in our study.  
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
The system of simultaneous equations is defined as follows: 
   (1) 
      (2) 
   (3) 
where R is the measure of risk (proxied by Z-score), E is efficiency, C is capital, A is assets 
(in log), RD is revenue diversification, LD is the ratio of loans to deposits, LA is ratio of loans 
to assets, G is GDP growth rate, I is inflation rate,; ,  and  are random errors. These 
variables are described in more detail in Table 1. Because the Z-score is highly skewed, we 
use the natural logarithm of the Z-score to make its distribution more normal. For brevity, we 
still use the label ‘‘Z-score’’ to represent the natural logarithm of the Z-score in the 
remainder of the study. Equation 1 tests whether efficiency and capital temporarily precede 
variations in bank risk. Equation 2 assesses if efficiency temporarily precedes variations in 
bank capital, whereas Equation 3 examines whether level of capital together with bank risk 
determine changes in bank efficiency.  
 
Based on hypotheses explaining the relationships between bank risk, capital and efficiency 
proposed by Berger and DeYoung (1997) above, bad management, skimping, bad luck, and 
moral hazard behaviours can be tested by the sign and significant level of parameters 1 
(positive), 1 (negative), 1 (positive), and 2 (positive), respectively (bearing in mind that a 
higher Z-score indicates that the bank is more stable). In particular, a positive 1 confirm that 
a reduction in cost/profit efficiency precedes an increase in bank risk (i.e., bad management 
occurs) whilst a negative 1 suggests an increase in cost/profit efficiency happens just before 
an increase in risk (i.e., skimping exists). The positive parameter 1 is interpreted as an 
increase in risk precedes a reduction in cost/profit efficiency (i.e., banks face bad luck). The 
moral hazard hypothesis tests whether low capital leads to risky behaviour of bank managers, 
which represents by the positive parameter 2. We focus this test to banks with low capital 
that moral hazard is more likely to occur. We expect that capital is negatively affected by 
operational efficiency, thus parameter 1 is expected to have a negative sign. 
 
10 
 
In order to check the sensitivity of results on bank management behaviour, we also use two 
alternative risk measures: volatility of returns on asset (ROA) and volatility of returns on 
equity (ROE), which are respectively measured by standard deviation of ROA and standard 
deviation of ROE. A higher volatility of ROA or ROE indicates that the bank is less stable.  
 
3.3. Data 
Indian commercial banks are divided into three categories based on ownership criteria: public 
banks (State Bank of India and its associates and nationalized banks), private banks (old 
private sector banks and new private sector banks) and joint-venture and foreign banks. A 
balanced panel, which includes 25 public banks and 15 private banks over the period 1994-
2011 and accounts for above 85 per cent of the deposits of the Indian banking system, is 
selected in this study. The source of data is International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd (Fitch-
IBCA).  
 
Table 1 shows that output data (Y1 and Y2) indicate that public banks are, on average, two 
times larger than private banks. The input price data show that public banks have lower 
financial capital price, but higher physical capital price and labour price than private banks. 
The period-averaged capital ratio is 5.5 per cent with a lower level in public banks than 
private banks. Data on risk measures (Z-score, ROA volatility and ROE volatility) show that 
public banks have greater risk-taking than private banks. Data on the remaining variables 
show that Indian banks, on average, intermediate 63 per cent of their deposits into loans, with 
a higher level in public banks than private banks. Lending volume accounts for 
approximately 50 per cent of total assets, with a slightly lower lending-intensive level in 
public banks than private banks. However, the income of Indian banks is mainly driven by 
income from lending. The average annual GDP growth rate and inflation rate are 7.04 per 
cent and 7.28 per cent, respectively.  
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Table 1: Description of variables used in the study 
Variables Description All banks Public banks Private banks 
Variables used for efficiency estimation 
   TC (Total Cost) The sum of interest expenses, other operating 
expenses and personnel expenses (million $US) 
934.24 1215.92 464.76 
 
(1840.99) (2063.86) (1263.05) 
PBT (Profit) Pre-tax profit (million $US) 147.73 184.71 86.11 
 
(338.22) (394.08) (201.08) 
Y1 (Output 1) Net loans measured by gross loans minus reserves for 
impaired loans (million $US) 
6818.58 9024.48 3142.08 
 
(14298.85) (16792.18) (7356.49) 
Y2 (Output 2) Other earning assets measured by investments and 
other earning assets (million $US) 
4577.51 5993.99 2216.71 
 
(8699.21) (9950.21) (5297.67) 
W1(Price of input 1)  Financial capital price calculated by the ratio of 
interest expenses to total funding 
0.063 0.062 0.066 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.017) 
W2(Price of input 2) Physical capital price computed by the ratio of other 
operating expenses to fixed assets 
0.935 0.958 0.895 
 
(0.631) (0.603) (0.675) 
W3 (Price of input 3)1 Labour price which is proxied by the ratio of 
personnel expenses to total assets 
0.014 0.016 0.011 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
t Time trend which equals 1 for year 1994, 2 for year 
1995 … and 18 for year 2011 
9.50 9.50 9.50 
 
(5.34) (5.34) (5.34) 
Variables used for examining the relationships between risk, capital and efficiency 
C The capital ratio measured by the ratio of equity to 
total assets 
0.055 0.047 0.067 
 
(0.027) (0.016) (0.036) 
R (Z-score) The ratio of ROA plus the capital ratio divided by the 
standard deviation of ROA 
12.110 11.014 13.937 
 
(6.150) (5.565) (6.636) 
R (ROA volatility) Standard deviation of ROA which shows the volatility 
of ROA 
0.006 0.007 0.006 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.001) 
R (ROE volatility) Standard deviation of ROE which shows the volatility 
of ROE 
0.156 0.187 0.104 
 
(0.174) (0.212) (0.031) 
A Logarithm of total assets which captures bank size 8.603 9.211 7.589 
 
(1.344) (0.894) (1.357) 
LD Intermediation ratio computed by the ratio of gross 
loans to deposits 
0.630 0.604 0.675 
 
(0.148) (0.131) (0.165) 
LA The ratio of gross loans to total assets 0.496 0.490 0.505 
 
(0.097) (0.102) (0.087) 
RD Revenue diversification computed by the ratio of non-
interest income to total income 
0.138 0.128 0.154 
 
(0.056) (0.038) (0.073) 
G The GDP growth rate (annual %) 7.040 7.040 7.040 
 
(2.150) (2.151) (2.153) 
I Consumer prices (annual %) 7.28 7.28 7.28 
  (3.07) (3.07) (3.07) 
Data on bank-specific variables is from FITCH-IBCA;  
Data on GDP growth and inflation are from World bank database; 
   Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
 
 
                                               
1 we cannot obtain data on the number of employees, this study follows , Bos and Schmiedel (2007), Huang et 
al. (2010)  and Liu and Chen (2012) to proxy labour price as a ratio of personnel expenses to total assets 
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4. Empirical results  
4.1. Operational efficiency 
To assess the validity of model, we conduct a Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test, which is defined 
as: , where  is the log likelihood of the unrestricted model 
and  is the log likelihood of the restricted model. The test statistics, which follows the 
2(n) distribution with n being the number of restrictions, for the cost and profit models were 
133.57 and 64.29, respectively. In our case the number of restrictions is 1 (i.e., u=0), hence 
the null hypothesis of no efficiency is rejected at 1% level of significance.   
 
Table 2: Cost and profit functions (SFA estimates) 
Variables 
Cost function   Profit function 
Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err. 
Constant 1.771*** (0.080) 
 
9.656*** (0.233) 
lny1 0.580*** (0.053) 
 
0.318* (0.155) 
lny2 0.414*** (0.051) 
 
-0.784*** (0.154) 
lnw1/w3 0.733*** (0.049) 
 
0.901*** (0.139) 
lnw2/w3 -0.127*** (0.035) 
 
0.314** (0.102) 
t -0.027*** (0.005) 
 
0.045** (0.015) 
(lny1)2 0.200*** (0.025) 
 
0.325*** (0.071) 
lny1*lny2 -0.207*** (0.025) 
 
-0.275*** (0.068) 
lny1*lnw1/w3 -0.075*** (0.017) 
 
-0.176*** (0.049) 
lny1*lnw2/w3 0.030** (0.011) 
 
-0.045 (0.031) 
lny1*t 0.001 (0.002) 
 
-0.025*** (0.007) 
(lny2)2 0.214*** (0.025) 
 
0.320*** (0.070) 
lny2*lnw1/w3 0.061*** (0.017) 
 
0.176*** (0.048) 
lny2*lnw2/w3 -0.026* (0.011) 
 
0.014 (0.031) 
lny2*t 0.001 (0.002) 
 
0.027*** (0.007) 
(lnw1/w3)2 0.165*** (0.020) 
 
-0.060 (0.056) 
lnw1/w3*lnw2/w3 -0.033** (0.012) 
 
0.041 (0.034) 
lnw1/w3*t 0.006** (0.002) 
 
-0.022*** (0.005) 
(lnw2/w3)2 0.036*** (0.010) 
 
0.003 (0.029) 
lnw2/w3*t 0.000 (0.001) 
 
0.002 (0.003) 
t2 0.000 (0.000) 
 
-0.001 (0.001) 
σu 0.6803 *** 
  
1.3260 *** 
 γ (σu/ σv) 21.51 *** 
  
9.34 *** 
 ***, ** and *: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Technological progress 
Figure 1 indicates that the average time derivatives of the cost function  for all banks, 
public banks and private banks are all below zero (-0.0050, -0.0053 and -0.0046, 
respectively). Thus, banks in India slightly benefit from technological progress in reducing 
costs, on average. Specifically, the  for the Indian banking system and its bank types 
experiences an increasing trend, but the value remains below zero over the period 1994-2011 
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(except public banks in year 2011). Moreover,  for public banks is slightly lower than 
private banks from 1994 to 2004, but slightly higher than private banks from 2005 to 2011. 
This suggests that technological progress has reduced costs incurred by Indian banks at a 
diminishing rate over the analysis period. Also, compared to private banks, the reduction of 
costs due to technological advances for public banks was slightly greater for the period 1994-
2004, but slightly lower for the period 2005-2011. 
 
Figure 2 shows that time derivatives of the profit function  are positive, on average. In 
particular, the  for the samples of all banks, public banks and private banks is 0.020, 
0.026 and 0.010, respectively. This result suggests that, overall, the average bank in India 
benefits from technological progress in increasing profits. Specifically,  for the Indian 
banking system and its bank types reveals a declining trend, but the value remains above zero 
between 1994 and 2011 (except for the years 2008 and 2011). Moreover,  for public 
banks is greater than private banks from 1994 to 2006, but comparable to private banks after 
that. This implies that technological progress has enhanced the profits of Indian banks at a 
diminishing rate over the analysis period (except years 2008 and 2011). Also, compared to 
private banks, the increase in profits caused by the technological advances for public banks 
was greater for the period 1994-2006, but comparable for the remaining analysis period. 
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Return to scale 
Figure 3 shows that the average output derivatives of the cost function  of all banks, 
public banks and private banks are 0.997, 0.999 and 0.993, respectively. Thus, overall, the 
average bank in India slightly benefits from scale in reducing costs. Specifically, from 1994 
to 2003,  experiences an increasing trend and is slightly below one, with a higher level 
in public banks than in private banks. However, from 2004 to 2011,  is slightly above or 
equal to one. This suggests that the Indian banking system and its bank types had reduced 
costs at a diminishing rate from expanding loans and investments over the period 1994-2003, 
but suffered constant or decreasing returns to scale over the period 2004-2011. Also, the 
reduction of costs from scale expansion was greater for private banks than public banks for 
the period 1994-2003.  
 
Figure 4 shows that the average profit elasticity ( ) of all banks, public banks and private 
banks are 0.167, 0.229 and 0.064, respectively. This finding suggests that an average bank in 
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India benefits from increasing returns to scale regarding profits.  experienced a steadily 
increasing trend and is above zero (except private banks in the years 1994-1997) and 
elasticity of public banks is consistently higher than that of private banks. Thus, Indian banks 
in the sample, regardless of bank types, have increased profits at an increasing rate from 
expanding loans and investments over the study period, and public banks outperform their 
private counterparts in this aspect. 
 
Technical efficiency 
Figures 5-6 show the yearly-mean cost and profit efficiency of the Indian banking system and 
its bank types while Table 3 displays the t-test for the null hypothesis that technical 
efficiencies are indifferent among bank types. Over the period 1994-2011, there is an unclear 
trend in both cost and profit efficiencies for all banks as well as both bank types except that 
cost efficiency of public banks experiences a slightly upward trend. The average cost and 
profit efficiency scores of banks in the 1994-2011 period are 0.950 and 0.934, respectively 
(i.e., banks can reduce costs by 5%, and increase profits by 6.6%, compared with best 
practices). This overall cost and profit efficiency levels are similar to the studies by Sensarma 
(2005) and Kalluru (2009). The results show that public banks are more cost-efficient, which 
is similar to the studies by Sahoo and Mandal (2011) and Wanniarachchige and Suzuki 
(2011). But these banks are slightly less profit-efficient, which is consistent with the study by 
Sensarma (2005). Specifically, public banks have comparable cost efficiency to private banks 
in the 1994-1998 period, but they have greater cost efficiency in the remaining period. Profit 
efficiency of public banks is lower in years 1999-2001, 2004-2005 and 2010, but comparable 
to private banks in the remaining years. Moreover, there is a significant and negative 
association between cost and profit efficiency scores, but the magnitude is weak (the 
correlation coefficient is -0.11 and has a p-value of 0.005). One possible explanation is that 
bank’ managers practice both bad management (low efficiency leads to high risk) and moral 
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hazard (low capital leads to high risk) behaviours. For example, banks with low capital may 
focus more attention to cost saving (i.e., improve costs efficiency) and take more risks 
damaging reputation and profits (i.e., decline profit efficiency).  
 
 
Table 3: Cost and profit efficiencies of the Indian banking system and its bank types  
Year 
Cost efficiency    Profit efficiency  
All  
banks 
Public  
banks 
Private 
 banks 
Gap   All  
banks 
Public  
banks 
Private 
 banks 
Gap  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3)-(4)     (6) (7) (8) (7)-(8)   
1994 0.929 0.935 0.920 0.015 
  
0.949 0.947 0.953 -0.006 
 1995 0.952 0.947 0.960 -0.013 
  
0.918 0.906 0.937 -0.031 
 1996 0.959 0.960 0.957 0.003 
  
0.932 0.932 0.931 0.001 
 1997 0.957 0.961 0.949 0.012 
  
0.937 0.939 0.933 0.006 
 1998 0.958 0.958 0.960 -0.002 
  
0.923 0.924 0.923 0.001 
 1999 0.961 0.963 0.957 0.006 
  
0.925 0.920 0.933 -0.013 ** 
2000 0.962 0.968 0.951 0.017 
  
0.917 0.909 0.932 -0.024 *** 
2001 0.962 0.970 0.950 0.020 ** 
 
0.922 0.916 0.933 -0.018 *** 
2002 0.957 0.970 0.935 0.035 *** 
 
0.932 0.929 0.936 -0.007 
 2003 0.939 0.960 0.905 0.055 *** 
 
0.950 0.948 0.954 -0.005 
 2004 0.930 0.956 0.885 0.072 *** 
 
0.952 0.947 0.959 -0.011 *** 
2005 0.936 0.960 0.895 0.065 *** 
 
0.949 0.944 0.957 -0.013 *** 
2006 0.944 0.965 0.908 0.057 *** 
 
0.946 0.943 0.950 -0.007 
 2007 0.938 0.954 0.911 0.043 *** 
 
0.935 0.934 0.937 -0.003 
 2008 0.958 0.962 0.951 0.011 
  
0.932 0.933 0.932 0.001 
 2009 0.950 0.965 0.924 0.041 *** 
 
0.938 0.937 0.939 -0.002 
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2010 0.951 0.969 0.920 0.050 *** 
 
0.935 0.929 0.945 -0.016 * 
2011 0.965 0.977 0.947 0.030 *** 
 
0.918 0.913 0.925 -0.012 
 Mean 0.950 0.961 0.932 0.029 ***   0.934 0.931 0.939 -0.009 *** 
t-test is used to check mean differences in efficiency among bank types;  
***, ** and *: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
4.2. Interrelationships between risk, capital and efficiency 
Table 4 displays the 3SLS estimation for the system of three simultaneous equations (1-3). 
The 2 values obtained from the 3SLS estimator indicate that the systems of three 
simultaneous equations for the samples of all banks, public banks and private banks are 
significant. Regarding Equation 1, cost efficiency is found to have positive and significant 
effect on Z-score (risk is proxied by Z-score that higher values indicate more stability) of all 
banks studied, regardless of type. Since the deterioration in cost efficiency leads to an 
increase in insolvency risk, this finding supports the bad management hypothesis. Also, our 
results show that an increase in profit efficiency leads to an increase in insolvency risk with 
the exception of private banks, hence supporting the skimping hypothesis. These contrary 
behaviours could be due to the presence of moral hazard behaviour, which explains a 
negative correlation between the cost and profit efficiency scores discussed above. We found 
that moral hazard behaviour does exist as expected and more detailed results on the test for 
moral hazard are presented at the end of this section. 
 
Better capitalized banks are found to suffer less insolvency risk when both bank types are 
combined. This finding is consistent with that of Tan and Floros (2013) for Chinese banks 
and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) for the U.S. banks. When capital is increased, the 
shareholders of private banks – individuals and organizations - tend to have more incentives 
to monitor the management performance than those of public banks – all citizens with the 
government being their representative. This leads to the fact that the negative effect of capital 
ratio on insolvency risk is significant in private banks, but insignificant in public banks. 
There is an inverse U-shape relationship between bank size (proxied by total assets) and risk 
when both bank types are combined, suggesting that Indian banks intensify risk management 
activities when their total assets exceed a certain level. Revenue diversification in Indian 
banks seems to reduce the insolvency risk, as non-interest income is less vulnerable to 
idiosyncratic shocks.  
 
Regarding Equation 2, a decrease in cost efficiency is found leading to an increase in capital 
ratio in Indian banks, which aligns with studies by Deelchand and Padgett (2010) and Kwan 
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and Eisenbeis (1997) for the U.S. banks. Banks often respond to a deterioration in cost 
efficiency by raising capital (numerator of capital ratio) as a precautionary step, while public 
banks respond to profit efficiency improvement by using their retained earnings as a 
supplement to equity (numerator of capital ratio). Ratio of loans to deposits is found to be 
positively and significantly related to capital ratio irrespective of bank ownership and 
efficiency measurement. One possible explanation is that banks with higher intermediation of 
deposits into loans have higher earnings to supplement the equity (numerator of capital ratio).  
 
Table 4: The relationships between risk, capital and efficiency for Indian banks 
Models 
Cost efficiency   Profit efficiency  
All banks Public banks Private banks   All banks Public banks Private banks 
Eq.(1) Dependent variable is risk (Z-score) 
Efficiency 2.6035*** 4.7340*** 1.6269** 
 
-3.5804** -7.2236*** -3.2190 
 
(0.4943) (1.1350) (0.5537) 
 
(1.2824) (1.6365) (1.8147) 
Equity to Total Assets 6.3685*** 1.9718 3.8148*** 
 
5.9253*** 3.8797 2.3918* 
 
(0.7124) (3.9205) (0.9392) 
 
(0.6333) (3.7833) (1.0400) 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.1293** -0.0803 0.1316* 
 
-0.1102** 0.2036 0.2915*** 
 
(0.0418) (0.2139) (0.0584) 
 
(0.0380) (0.2611) (0.0862) 
Ln(Total Assets)^2 0.0091*** 0.0070 -0.0066 
 
0.0083*** -0.0051 -0.0170** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0103) (0.0039) 
 
(0.0023) (0.0127) (0.0053) 
Revenue Diversification 1.0789*** 0.1688 1.0145*** 
 
0.1792 1.4101*** 0.1684 
 
(0.2112) (0.2488) (0.2207) 
 
(0.1163) (0.4136) (0.1910) 
Inflation -0.0012 -0.0023 0.0013 
 
-0.0073** -0.0034 0.0007 
 
(0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0035) 
 
(0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0050) 
Constant 0.8021 -1.2074 0.8591 
 
6.7063*** 8.2501*** 5.0360*** 
 
(0.6118) (1.7588) (0.5590) 
 
(1.1977) (1.6882) (1.4807) 
Eq.(2) Dependent variable is capital (ratio of equity to total assets) 
Efficiency -0.1931*** -0.4647*** -0.1409** 
 
1.3475 0.5816*** -0.1078 
 
(0.0396) (0.1044) (0.0504) 
 
(1.2903) (0.1304) (0.3049) 
Loans to Deposits 0.0569*** 0.0764*** 0.0497*** 
 
0.0438* 0.0508*** 0.0435** 
 
(0.0067) (0.0101) (0.0136) 
 
(0.0193) (0.0071) (0.0133) 
GDP Growth 0.00001 -0.0009* -0.0001 
 
-0.0013 -0.0010 0.0007 
 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0010) 
 
(0.0035) (0.0005) (0.0013) 
Inflation 0.0003 -0.0010*** 0.0021** 
 
0.0015 -0.0002 0.0016 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) 
 
(0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0008) 
Constant 0.1998*** 0.4612*** 0.1502** 
 
-1.2330 -0.5167*** 0.1229 
 
(0.0392) (0.0974) (0.0521) 
 
(1.2007) (0.1218) (0.2858) 
Eq.(3) Dependent variable is efficiency 
Z-score 0.0321 0.0796** 0.0592 
 
-0.0158 -0.0578 0.1599 
 
(0.0310) (0.0251) (0.1267) 
 
(0.0217) (0.0323) (0.1235) 
Equity to Total Assets -1.4088*** -2.2261*** -1.4126*** 
 
0.4463** 2.4934** 0.1005 
 
(0.1541) (0.6505) (0.2904) 
 
(0.1584) (0.8629) (0.2560) 
Revenue Diversification -0.2636*** 0.0220 -0.4081*** 
 
-0.0036 0.0241 -0.1410 
 
(0.0353) (0.0350) (0.0828) 
 
(0.0138) (0.0511) (0.0799) 
Loans to Total Assets 0.1338*** 0.1495*** 0.1434* 
 
-0.0319*** -0.0964** -0.0796 
 
(0.0229) (0.0264) (0.0656) 
 
(0.0078) (0.0353) (0.0615) 
GDP Growth -0.0027*** -0.0010 -0.0062*** 
 
0.0017* 0.0002 0.0038** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0018) 
 
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0014) 
Inflation -0.0004 -0.0015** 0.0029 
 
-0.0011* 0.0005 -0.0033* 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0015) 
 
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0013) 
Constant 0.9127*** 0.7445*** 0.8390* 
 
0.9747*** 1.0442*** 0.4479 
 
(0.0902) (0.0629) (0.3820) 
 
(0.0625) (0.0814) (0.3706) 
2 for Equation 1 230.1263 139.1742 54.3503 
 
264.4973 125.6213 36.9606 
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2 for Equation 2 136.4323 69.7912 44.7499 
 
9.0442 67.3049 20.5772 
2 for Equation 3 297.1047 54.1641 175.1209 
 
57.2339 13.7683 16.8237 
Observations 720 450 270 
 
720 450 270 
***, ** and *: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
Standard errors in parentheses 
The results also show that an increase in GDP growth leads to a decrease in capital ratio in 
public banks, but it is only significant at 10% and only occur in the cost function. This could 
be because public banks expand lending and investment when the economy is in a good 
shape (e.g., GDP growth increases, unemployment decreases), resulting in an increase in total 
assets, which is the denominator of capital ratio. An increase in inflation rate is associated 
with a decrease in capital ratio in public banks, but an increase in this ratio in private banks. 
We argue that when inflation grows, public banks may still expand lending for the purpose of 
improving the economy under the influence of the government, while private banks can 
reduce lending (a main source of denominator of capital ratio) due to higher probability of 
loan default.     
 
Results for Equation 3 show that Z-score creates positive and significant impacts on the cost 
efficiency of public banks (i.e., an increase in risk leads to a significant decrease in cost 
efficiency). This finding supports the bad luck hypothesis in the Indian public banks. 
However, this finding is not significant when a profit function is analyzed, which could be 
due to the negative and significant relation between cost efficiency and profit efficiency. An 
increase in capital ratio is found to temporally precede a decrease in cost efficiency, but a 
reverse sign occurs at the profit aspect. Banks which raise equity as a funding source for 
loans usually involve higher costs, but they generate higher revenue than those relying on 
income from deposits (Berger and Mester, 1997). Revenue diversification is found to have a 
negative effect on cost efficiency of Indian banks with the exception of public banks. This 
could be because the expenses for non-lending products are greater than those for lending-
products, and private banks tend to intensify revenue diversification more than public banks.  
 
The ratio of loans to total assets is found to be associated positively with cost efficiency, but 
negatively with profit efficiency. One possible explanation is that loans are increased by 
lowering both deposit and lending interest rates, but the decreased interest expenses (paid to 
depositors) do not offset the reduced interest incomes (received from borrowers). GDP 
growth is found to decrease cost efficiency and increase profit efficiency of Indian banks 
(except public banks). This could be because in a better economy, the demand for loans is 
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higher while the supply for deposits is lower, so banks spend additional costs to mobilize 
funds for loans and hence, interest income is offset. However, private banks could be more 
dynamic in this business than public banks, so effects of increased funding cost are not 
significant in public banks.  
Inflation is found to decrease cost efficiency of public banks, but decrease profit efficiency of 
private banks. One possible explanation is that when inflation grows, public banks still 
expand loans under the influence of the government while private banks reduce lending, so 
public banks suffer higher loan losses than private banks. However, the income generated 
from lending expansion in public banks offset the loans losses; thereby profit efficiency of 
public banks is not affected by inflation. 
 
Table 5: Moral hazard test (Eq. 1) 
 Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
Eq.(1) Dependent variable is risk (Z-score) 
Efficiency 1.3620 -1.5357 
 
(0.9112) (1.1366) 
Equity to Total Assets 13.0781*** 13.0321*** 
 
(2.8710) (2.9475) 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.0582 -0.0752 
 
(0.0492) (0.0517) 
Ln(Total Assets)^2 0.0047 0.0057 
 
(0.0032) (0.0033) 
Revenue Diversification 1.0322*** 0.8581*** 
 
(0.1955) (0.1881) 
Inflation 0.0028 0.0007 
 
(0.0024) (0.0026) 
Constant 1.4074 4.2467*** 
 
(0.8732) (1.1883) 
***, ** and *: 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Low capitalized banks: banks have capital ratio below than the sample median (N=360) 
 
We test the moral hazard hypothesis by re-estimating the system of equations 1-3 for the 
subsample of banks with the capital ratio below the sample median. Results of Equation 1 
show that the capital ratio creates a positive effect on Z-score irrespective of the efficiency 
measurement (see Table 5). In other words, a decrease in capital leads to an increase in the 
risk of insolvency, supporting the moral hazard hypothesis. 
 
Robust tests of managerial hypotheses by other risk measures 
In order to have robust inferences on the managerial behaviour in Indian banks, we re-
estimate the system of the three simultaneous equations for the samples of all banks, public 
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banks, private banks, and low capitalized banks by using the two alternative measures of risk: 
volatility of ROA and volatility of ROE. Partial results of these re-estimations are presented 
in Table 6. For convenience in comparison, we also put partial results of the system of three 
simultaneous equations when risk is measured by Z-score. Note that a higher Z-score 
indicates that the bank is more stable while a higher volatility of ROA or ROE indicates that 
the bank is less stable. It can be seen that findings remain robust when risk is measured by the 
volatility of ROA and volatility of ROE. 
 
Table 6: Robust tests  
Model 
 
 
Cost efficiency 
 
Profit efficiency 
Risk=Z-
score 
Risk=ROA 
Volatility 
Risk=ROE 
Volatility  
Risk=Z-
score 
Risk=ROA 
Volatility 
Risk=ROE 
Volatility 
A Robust test on hypotheses bad management,  bad luck and skimping 
A.1 In Indian banks (sample of all banks: N=720 obs) 
 Eq.(1) Dependent variable is risk  
 Efficiency 2.6035*** -0.0177 -0.6302 
 
-3.5804** 0.0548 3.4430* 
 
 
(0.4943) (0.0118) (0.5580) 
 
(1.2824) (0.0295) (1.4561) 
 Eq.(3) Dependent variable is efficiency 
        Risk 0.0321 -2.7984 -0.0613 
 
-0.0158 0.7102 0.0318 
 
 
(0.0310) (2.7767) (0.0737) 
 
(0.0217) (2.2685) (0.0606) 
A.2 In public banks (sample of public banks: N=450 obs) 
 Eq.(1) Dependent variable is risk  
 Efficiency 4.7340*** -0.1617*** -7.5598*** 
 
-7.2236*** 0.1811*** 9.2551** 
 
 
(1.1350) (0.0330) (1.7903) 
 
(1.6365) (0.0513) (2.9023) 
 Eq.(3) Dependent variable is efficiency 
        Risk 0.0796** -6.4946*** -0.1571*** 
 
-0.0578 4.9585*** 0.1192*** 
 
 
(0.0251) (1.2455) (0.0268) 
 
(0.0323) (1.1096) (0.0188) 
A.3 In private banks (sample of private banks: N=270 obs) 
 Eq.(1) Dependent variable is risk  
 Efficiency 1.6269** -0.0143** 0.0059 
 
-3.2190 0.0243 0.2822 
 
 
(0.5537) (0.0052) (0.1097) 
 
(1.8147) (0.0154) (0.3317) 
 Eq.(3) Dependent variable is efficiency 
        Risk 0.0592 -9.7461 0.3918* 
 
0.1599 -13.8083* -0.2933** 
 
 
(0.1267) (8.4124) (0.1929) 
 
(0.1235) (5.8871) (0.0894) 
B Robust test on hypothesis moral hazard  
 Sample of low capitalized banks (N=360 obs) 
 Eq.(1) Dependent variable is risk  
 Equity to Total Assets 13.0781*** -0.2804*** -17.9074** 
 
13.0321*** -0.3049*** -19.9204*** 
   (2.8710) (0.0829) (5.6229)   (2.9475) (0.0846) (5.7273) 
***: 1% level of significance; **: 5% level of significance; *: 10% level of significance 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Low capitalised banks: banks have capital ratio greater than the median 
 
In general, findings on managerial behaviour in Indian banks are similar to those of Berger 
and DeYoung (1997) and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) for US commercial banks which were 
found to exhibit bad management, bad luck, skimming and moral hazard behaviour; those of 
22 
 
Williams (2004) and Fiordelisi et al. (2011) for European banks which were found to be 
affected by bad management; those of Deelchand and Padgett (2010) for Japanese 
cooperative banks which were found to exhibit bad management, bad luck and skimping; and 
those of Das and Ghosh (2004) for Indian public banks which were found to show bad luck. 
 
5. Conclusion and policy implication 
We used stochastic cost and profit frontier models to comprehensively assess the efficiency 
of 40 Indian banks during the 1994-2011 period. We found that the average cost and profit 
efficiency scores are 0.950 and 0.934, respectively. Public banks are more cost-efficient, but 
slightly less profit-efficient than private banks, and with the efficiency experiencing an 
unclear trend over the study period. Indian banks benefit from technological progress and 
scale expansion in reducing costs and increasing profits. Further, we employed three-stage 
least square estimation for the system of three simultaneous equations to investigate the 
relationships between risk, capital and efficiency. We found that a decline in cost efficiency 
is generally followed by an increase in insolvency risk (“bad management”). A decrease in 
capital ratio is generally followed by an increase in the insolvency risk (“moral hazard”). In 
public banks, a rise in insolvency risk is generally followed by a decline in cost efficiency 
(“bad luck”) while an increase in profit efficiency temporarily precedes an increase in the 
insolvency risk (“skimping”). Better capitalized banks suffer lower insolvency risk and 
achieve higher profit efficiency. Each of these results have a small impact on banks on 
average, but may have a considerable impact on individual banks that are most subject to bad 
luck, bad management, skimping and/or moral hazard. 
 
These findings may have some policy implications. The bad management evidence in both 
public and private banks suggests that bank regulators and supervisors should consider cost 
efficiency as a good predictor of risky banks. The bad luck in public banks evidence implies 
that bank regulators and supervisors should limit public banks’ exposures to external shocks 
by diversifying income streams or restricting loan to assets ratio. The skimping hypothesis in 
public banks suggests that bank regulators and supervisors should consider profit efficiency 
as a proxy for insolvency risk in public banks. The moral hazard hypothesis implies that bank 
regulators and supervisors should carefully monitor capital ratio in the low capitalized banks 
in order to require them to quickly raise this capital when it declines. The finding that capital 
ratio has a negative effect on the risk of insolvency, but a positive effect on profit efficiency 
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suggests that capital ratio could be an efficient tool to reduce the insolvency risk and  
improve the profit performance.  
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